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Abstract  
A growing literature has focussed attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ 
behaviour in political settings, particularly voting.   A common criticism of the 
expressive idea is that it is rather ad hoc and lacking in both predictive and normative 
bite. We agree that no clear definition of expressive behaviour has gained wide 
acceptence to date, and no detailed understanding of the range of foundations of specific 
expressive motivations has emerged. In response, we provide a foundational discussion 
and definition of expressive behaviour that accounts for a range of factors. We also 
discuss the content of expressive choice distinguishing between identity-based, moral, 
and social cases, and relate this more general account to the specific theories of 
expressive choice in the literature. Finally, we discuss the normative and institutional  
implications of expressive behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing attention is being paid to the distinction between ‘instrumental’ and 
‘expressive’ choice in the political literature, and specifically in that part of the literature 
devoted to voting behaviour. The idea of ‘expressive voting’, captures the idea that 
voting may be motivated by concerns other than a concern for the eventual outcome of 
the election; concerns that are more directly and immediately linked to the act of voting, 
or of voting for a particular candidate or option, itself.  A now-standard line of argument 
in support of the idea of expressive voting in large-scale elections begins with the 
observation that for an ordinary member of a large electorate, their individual vote is 
extremely unlikely to determine the electoral outcomes. Any ‘instrumental’ calculus 
that focuses on the expected benefits associated with the outcome of the election, and 
admits that voting is at least somewhat costly, is therefore likely to show that voting is 
irrational. By emphasising aspects of the act of voting,  or of voting for a particular 
candidate or option,  that do not depend on the outcome of the election, voting may be 
portrayed  as individually rational; and such aspects have been labelled ‘expressive’.1  
 
The basic idea here seems clear enough: voting, or voting in a particular way,  may 
‘express’ some aspect of the voter’s beliefs, values, ideology, identity or personality 
regardless of any impact that the vote has on the outcome of the election, and such 
‘expression’ may be valuable to the individual in its own right and so provide sufficient 
motivation to vote. But this basic idea needs considerable further development if it is to 
offer more than a general critique of the standard instrumental model. Expressive theory 
must move beyond the mere logic of the idea of expressive voting and the contrast with 
instrumental voting, in order to face a range of issues concerned with behaviour other 
than voting, the content of the relevant expression and the behavioural and normative 
implications of expressive behaviour.   
 
Because much of the literature to date has focussed attention on the basic contrast 
between expressive and  instrumental voting2  it has exhibited many different 
approaches to the content of expressive behaviour. Responding to this variety, a 
common criticism of the expressive idea is that its myriad possibilities make it rather ad 
hoc and lacking in specific predictive and normative bite.  We agree that  no single, 
clear definition of the content of expressive behaviour has achieved general acceptance;  
instead there are several competing  accounts.  Recently, for example,  Hillman  has 
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offered a definition of expressive utility as that utility that derives from confirming 
identity3. While his approach has much in common with the discussion to follow, and 
we certainly agree that identity is an important element in understanding expressive 
behaviour, we disagree with the claim that confirmation of identity exhausts the 
potential sources of expressive utility;  rather we see identity as just one possible source 
of expressive benefit.   The ideas of duty,  morality, deception and self-deception (as 
well as other ideas) all feature alongside issues associated with identity.  For reasons to 
be discussed in section 2 below, we do not pursue the specification of a formal utility 
function,  rather we seek to interrogate the nature of expressive behaviour in more 
general terms.  Partly because of the variety of approaches adopted, there is also no 
consensus on the implications, either positive or normative, that can be drawn from the 
analysis of expressive behaviour.  Indeed some discussions of expressive voting focus 
only on the decision to vote, and the implications for electoral turnout, rather than the 
decision of how to vote and the implications for electoral outcomes.   
 
In response, we provide a more detailed definitional account of expressive behaviour 
and, with definitions in place, discuss the foundational content of expressive choice 
distinguishing between a number of cases and relating these cases to the specific 
theories of expressive choice in the literature. We also discuss the normative 
implications of the various theories.  
 
This paper is intended, in part, to survey the literature on expressive choice. However, 
the paper is distinct from a number of recent papers that set out to survey the literature 
on voting turnout/participation and which refer to the expressive idea as one of several 
approaches to this topic.4 We focus on expressive motivations and behaviour across the 
range of political behaviour, but even when limited to the area of voting, our focus 
differs from that in the turnout/participation literature. The primary concern in that 
literature is explaining why individuals vote at all rather than how they vote. By 
focussing on the content of expressive choice, rather than the logic of expressive choice, 
we will focus on how individuals vote and, more generally, how they behave.   
 
While the paper has a survey aspect, it is intended to be much more than that. Our major 
aims are first to expand the understanding of expressive behaviour beyond the specifics 
of voting in large scale elections, and beyond the sharp contrast with instrumental 
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behaviour. We will argue throughout that expressive ideas are potentially relevant 
across all institutional arrangements and in a wide variety of contexts, and that it is the 
interaction between expressive and instrumental consideration, rather than the contrast 
between them, that is important.  
 
Our second major aim is to use the variety of substantive accounts of expressive 
behaviour not as a critique of the operationalisation of the expressive idea, but rather as 
an indicator of the richness of the expressive domain. In the instrumental domain, we 
are well used to the idea that individual interests are complex and context dependent, 
and while it may be appropriate in some models to compress interests into one or two 
variables (such as income or wealth maximisation) we understand that this stands in 
place of a more detailed and nuanced account of interests that becomes relevant if we 
wish to explore behaviour at a finer granularity. Similarly, in the expressive domain we 
argue that the range of expressive concerns is wide and complex, and that there may be 
tensions between different expressive concerns. It is precisely in the recognition of this 
large and nuanced domain of expressive concerns that we see the chief benefit of 
incorporating the expressive idea into the discussion of rational accounts of politics. 
Expressive motivation is not a simple idea deployed to escape from the paradox of 
voting and resolve some seeming difficulties in the theory of voting; rather expressive 
motivations open up a new area of study which allow rational choice techniques to be 
employed in ways that more accurately reflect the meaning and symbolic significance of 
much political behaviour.  
 
The focus of the next section is on providing a more precise and useful definition of 
expressive choice, one that is capable of applying in a variety of settings. In debating a 
variety of approaches to explaining voting in rational terms, Dowding concludes that the 
main reason why non-instrumental explanations for voting find little favour with some 
political scientists and political economists is not so much that they find it tautological 
or lacking in predictive power, but that the critics have a ‘desire for deeper reasons’.5 
An important aspect of the following assessment of the various theories of expressive 
action is whether they do more than simply state the possibility of an expressive 
motivation. That is, can they provide the required ‘deeper reasons’ that would underpin 
any particular expressive motivation? And, indeed, would such ‘deeper reasons’ satisfy 
a reasonable definition of what is required for a choice to be expressive? 
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In section 3 we will survey the various theories of expressive choice that have emerged 
and the related empirical work. We identify three broad categories of expressive 
theories; relating in turn to expressing identity, expressing moral views, and expressing 
social pressures, ‘rational irrationality’ and self-delusion. With these three broad 
accounts in place, we will then turn to questions of the efficiency or inefficiency of 
expressive behaviour and its institutional implications.  Section  4 will offer concluding 
comments.  
 
2. Expressive Behaviour: towards a definition 
A major reason why the idea of expressive behaviour has received so much attention in 
the analysis of voting is that its underlying logic seems both clear and attractive.6 While 
the specific content of expressive choice is contentious, the basic idea of what it means 
for a choice to be expressive appears relatively uncontroversial. However, we suggest 
that this view is a little too optimistic, and that definitional aspects of expressive 
behaviour need rather more careful consideration. We will also suggest that the focus on 
the voting context can be unhelpful in identifying a more general definition of 
expressive behaviour. 
 
There is a basic difficulty in providing a simple statement of the distinction between 
instrumental and expressive accounts of behaviour within a rational framework.  If an 
act is rational it is explicable in terms of the achievement of some purpose, and such a 
purpose can be associated with (net) benefit or ‘utility’. In this very general sense all 
rational action is ‘instrumental’: action is a means toward the achievement of specified 
purposes. However, the distinction between instrumental and expressive accounts of 
behaviour that concerns us here operates at a slightly finer granularity.  First, distinguish 
between direct and indirect accounts of choice/action, where a direct account focuses 
attention on some property of the choice/act itself as the source of motivation, while the 
indirect account focuses on some more remote outcome that follows (logically, causally, 
or probabilistically) from the choice/act.  Next, within the class of direct accounts, 
distinguish between two types of benefit7. First, what we will refer to as consumption 
benefits. These are the kind of benefits that are familiar in any act of final consumption: 
when I eat a favourite fruit there may be indirect motivations and explanations in terms 
of, say, the health benefits of eating fruit, but there may also be direct benefits in terms 
 6
of the sheer pleasure of the act of eating the fruit.  In contrast to these direct 
consumption benefits, consider the sub-class of direct benefits that derive not from the 
consumption aspect of the act/decision, but from its symbolic or representational aspect: 
not from the act, but from its meaning.  It is this sub-class of direct benefits that are 
engaged in expressive accounts of behaviour.  
 
We emphasize that not all direct or intrinsic benefits are ‘expressive’ in nature. Consider 
the link between the basic idea of expressive voting and Olson’s classic Logic of 
Collective Action. In Olson’s discussion, a fundamental contrast is between those 
benefits associated with the group that are dependent on collective action and subject to 
possible free-riding, and those benefits of group membership that are directly accessible 
to individuals and which can therefore act as selective incentives for individuals to join 
the group. These selective incentives play a very similar role in Olson’s theory to the 
role played by expressive benefits in expressive voting theory – in both cases they focus 
attention on the direct benefits that are individually accessible – but there is no sense in 
which Olson’s selective incentives must be expressive in nature. Indeed, the standard 
examples are simple consumption benefits.8  This is not to say that expressive ideas play 
no part; it may be that one selective incentive that relates to joining particular groups is 
the desire to identify with that group . The point here is simply that the link between the 
idea of a direct benefit that flows from the performance of an act, and an expressive 
benefit is not automatic. The expressive idea identifies a sub-set of all possible direct, 
intrinsic or performative benefits.  
 
With these ideas in place, we might attempt to construct comparative statements of the 
instrumental and expressive cases in what might be termed their ‘pure’ forms. In the 
instrumental case, acts/choices have no symbolism or meaning in themselves, so that 
individuals  act/choose in ways that respond only to indirect benefits and  direct 
consumption benefits. They act/choose in such a way that the acts/choices maximally 
serve their interests (whether narrowly or broadly defined). By contrast, in the purely 
expressive case, the individual responds only to the  meaning of the act/choice, so as to 
act/choose in a way that maximally expresses the individual. Indirect and consumption 
benefits are irrelevant in such a purely expressive account, individuals undertake action 
Z in order simply to expresss some relevant meaning bound up in Z (and, perhaps, 
beeing seen to Z).9 
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But, of course, ‘pure’ cases are rare. Most cases involve both instrumental and 
expressive considerations. In all-things-considered choice  individuals respond to all 
types of benefit, giving each the appropriate weight. The various considerations may 
reinforce each other or pull in different directions, so that there may be trade-offs 
between expressive and instrumental considerations, just as there may be trade-offs 
between different instrumental considerations, or between different expressive 
considerations.  It should be clear that, in our view, expressive concerns are best 
conceptualised as a proper sub-set of the concerns that will be considered in a fully 
rational analysis of all-things-considered evaluation and choice. And exactly the same 
may be said for instrumental concerns. Each is a part of the whole.10   
 
Just as the idea of expressive benefits should be seen as narrower than the idea of direct 
benefits, so the simple idea of ‘expression’ may be in another way too broad. Consider 
my behaviour when I accidentally hit my thumb with a hammer. I may cry out in pain, 
and that cry may naturally be termed an expression of my pain. But is this the sort of 
expression that we are concerned with in developing a theory of expressive behaviour?  
Our approach is to place the theory of expressive behaviour firmly within the rational 
choice approach, so that the types of expression that concern us are those that relate to 
the motivating of rational action. We might term this sub-set of expressions the set of 
motivating expressions. Now, in the case of my hammering, the possibility of a painful 
blow certainly provides me with reason to be careful, but the idea of the expression of 
pain (as distinct from the pain itself) plays no obvious motivational role.11 
 
So far, then, we have done no more than mark out the territory that we believe the 
theory of rationally expressive behaviour seeks to occupy. It aims to focus attention on 
the potential motivating effects of certain forms of expression that attach directly to 
actions or choices. The theory may be seen both as capable of offering distinctive 
understandings of particular situations (such as voting) where instrumental rational 
choice theory fails to convince; and of contributing to the more general understanding 
of rationality in a wider range of situations. As we have stressed, all-things-considered 
rational choice should be seen as including all direct and indirect benefits (and costs). 
Expressive considerations may not be relevant in all choice situations, or may be of 
vanishingly small importance in some situations, but the general idea that expressive 
ideas may be relevant alongside more instrumental considerations is important; not least 
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since it points to the idea that expressive and instrumental motivations are best seen as 
joint inputs into an overall analysis of behaviour, rather than alternative models.  
 
In any given situation where both expressive and instrumental considerations are 
relevant, the action that would be chosen on expressive grounds may differ from the 
action that would be chosen on either instrumental grounds or as the result of all-things-
considered choice, but this is not necessarily so. To the extent that expressive and 
instrumental arguments pull in different directions, it is common to locate the trade-off 
between them as part of standard economic price theory.12  We should expect to see 
essentially expressive choice triggered more readily in those situations where the ‘price’ 
of such behaviour is low; where ‘price’ is construed in terms of instrumental 
considerations foregone. In cases where the decision-maker faces all-things-considered 
choice, expressive considerations will be relevant but the price that has to be paid to 
choose expressively in terms of the more instrumental benefits foregone may be higher 
or lower depending on the circumstances. In cases, such as voting, where action can be 
argued to be divorced from further outcomes the price of expressive behaviour is low, 
and we should expect it to dominate.13  
 
However, the voting situation presents a number of features that frame the definition of 
expressive behaviour, and we should be careful in teasing them apart. Here we will 
consider three further issues relevant to defining expressive behaviour. The first 
concerns the structure of collective action problems and the link to the general idea of 
inconsequential behaviour, the second concerns the potential audience for expressive 
behaviour, and the third concerns the relationship between expressed views and true 
views. 
 
As noted, the standard argument for expressive voting starts from the presumption that 
voting in large-scale elections poses a collective action problem that renders individual 
votes essentially irrelevant to the determination of the outcome. It might then be 
supposed that expressive behaviour is limited to situations that may be characterised as 
collective action problems.  But that would be a mistake.  
 
For example, consider a situation in which an individual decides to write to a local 
newspaper to complain about some feature of local life and perhaps to suggest a 
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remedy. How might this behaviour be explained? The standard instrumental line would 
have to be that the individual sees this as a means of generating a desirable outcome: 
perhaps the implementation of the suggested remedy. But the expressive line would 
suggest that the behaviour is best understood simply in terms of venting dissatisfaction, 
or identifying with the critical position, and that the observed behaviour might be 
expressively rational even if the individual knew in advance that writing to a newspaper 
would have absolutely no impact on the situation complained about. Here several 
aspects of the standard voting story are absent: there is no background belief that 
decision making relative to the particular aspect of local life is made by reference to the 
aggregate level of letter writing and there is no necessary reference to interactions 
amongst large numbers of individuals, so this is not a collective action problem. In this 
case the act of letter writing just is inconsequential (ex hypothesi), and it is this fact that 
both invites and suggests an expressive account. 
 
This example suggests that the case of expressive voting may not always be a good 
guide to the more general class of expressive behaviour insofar as the case of voting 
focuses our attention on issues such as collective action and the large number case 
which are not defining aspects of expressive choice.14 And this point is at least 
reinforced by considering other analogies and examples that are commonly used within 
the expressive voting literature. Brennan and Buchanan (1984) and Brennan and 
Lomasky (1993) compare expressive voting to cheering at a sports match, and to dinner 
party conversation. Both examples are taken to describe situations in which the action to 
be explained is both ‘inconsequential’ and literally ‘expressive’ in terms of the use of 
voice. While we agree that these are examples of expressive behaviour, we are not 
convinced of the analogy with voting. In the dinner party case, the general idea is 
simply that I might express support for ideas, positions or policies that I might not 
support instrumentally. But here again a number of key features of the voting case are 
missing. There is no valid assumption that the aggregate of dinner party conversations is 
causally effective in bringing about any outcome, there is no necessary reference to the 
size of the dinner party (or the number of dinner parties) and so on. All there is, and all 
there needs to be, is a plausible claim that dinner party statements are (largely) 
inconsequential with respect to the apparent content of those statements. If I say ‘I 
support X’, it has no significant effect on whether X comes about. And the whole point 
of the dinner party analogy, presumably, is that this inconsequential setting may 
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produce statements that are at variance with the actions that the same individual would 
undertake under instrumental choice. In this way the dinner party story speaks directly 
to the ‘how to vote?’ question, rather than to the ‘why vote?’ question, in that it 
addresses the question of what we say at dinner parties, rather than why we speak at all.   
 
In the case of cheering at sports events, even if we accept that cheering may be 
instrumentally effective in increasing the probability that your team wins to at least 
some extent, and that the large numbers involved at a sports venue generates a 
collective action, free-rider problem in regard to adding your voice to the cheering,15 it 
seems that the most that can be offered here is an account that addresses the ‘why 
cheer?’ question rather than the ‘how to cheer?’ question. After all, it is hard to see a 
Manchester United fan cheering against his team and explaining his behaviour on the 
expressive grounds that it didn’t make an instrumental difference!  
 
The point here, then, is that the construction of a case which approximates ‘pure’ 
expressive choice requires the suppression of all (or almost all) instrumental 
considerations. Only when action is inconsequential, in this sense, will action be purely 
expressive. Collective action problems may be one way of generating examples, but 
they are not the only way.  Furthermore, this does not imply that expressive 
considerations are only present or relevant in such ‘pure’ settings.  Imagine a member of 
a committee facing a decision on some issue, and start from the premise that if one 
focussed only on instrumental considerations this person would favour action X, but 
that if one focussed only on expressive considerations she would favour action Y. Now, 
one question is, what action would this person favour all-things-considered? That is, 
what would she choose if she were fully decisive? Note that the answer here is not 
necessarily X. Expressive benefits remain benefits even if the individual faces 
consequential choice and it may be that the expressive costs associated with X are just 
too high. If the issue is expressively salient it might be that she would choose Y or it 
might be that once all things have been considered and given their due weight, she 
would choose some third option Z that offers a better balance of instrumental and 
expressive benefits than either ‘pure’ choice. Even in purely private choice (that is, in a 
committee of one) an individual may value an expressive concern more highly than 
instrumental concerns and so take decisions that are best understood in expressive terms 
even though the individual was fully decisive.  
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But a second question is how the committee member’s action might vary in different 
institutional settings, particularly as the size of the committee varies. Here we have a 
clearer answer. If we start with a committee of one member, we must conclude that she 
would adopt her all-things-considered choice, whatever that is.  Increasing the 
committee size will emphasize the expressive at the expense of the instrumental, so that 
beyond some limit she will choose Y.   
 
These two questions, and their answers, point to two different aspects of expressive 
choice. First, including issues of expressive concern into an analysis of rational political 
choice may yield different outcomes from those that would be revealed by a more 
rigidly instrumental approach, even if the institutional circumstances were not such as to 
approximate to the case of ‘pure’ expressive choice. If expressions matter, they can 
affect behaviour; and building this feature into our definitions and analysis may be 
important in many cases. Second, institutional circumstances will be important in 
influencing the balance between instrumental and expressive issues as they appear to 
actors, and so directly influence behaviour under those institutional circumstances. In 
this way, the articulation of the expressive/instrumental distinction helps us to approach 
the idea of the endogeneity of political behaviour with respect to political institutions.  
 
In cases such as dinner party conversation it may appear that the mere fact that the act 
under consideration is a speech-act is sufficient to engage with the expressive idea, but 
this is misleading.  Consider the case of an election speech by a professional politician. 
Here it seems clear that the motivation for the speech, and for the content of the speech, 
is instrumental and it is the instrumental nature of the speech that raise the potential for 
the content of the speech to be deceptive, since the politician will face an incentive to 
say whatever will increase the probability of his election, and to say different things to 
different audiences.  Nevertheless, there may be a connection between the 
(instrumental) use of political rhetoric by politicians and expressive ideas. If the 
politician recognizes the potentially expressive nature of voting decisions by the 
electorate, he will use his speech to signal in relation to those expressive concerns. The 
use of emotive language, appeals to patriotism or morality, as well as tactics such as the 
vilification of opponents may all provide examples. In such cases political rhetoric, 
which may or may not be deceptive, may be viewed as the vehicle for expressive 
 12
concerns. 16 The distinction between an election speech and dinner party conversation 
illustrates the difference between recognizing an expressive aspect of an instrumental 
action, and offering an essentially expressive explanation. The case of the election 
speech also illustrates the fact that it is often the interaction between expressive and 
instrumental considerations that is important.  
 
Our second concern relates to the visibility of the behaviour under consideration. While 
the act of voting is at least somewhat public, the secrecy of the ballot typically assures 
us that the content of our vote is private. By contrast, many of the examples of 
expressive behaviour already given (writing to newspapers, cheering, and dinner party 
conversation) are all essentially public, so that we can immediately see the possibility of 
them being expressive in nature. This raises the question of whether an act must be at 
least somewhat public in order to qualify as an expressive act; in short, does an 
expressive act require an audience?  
 
One possibility is that the actor may form her own audience; i.e. that expression can, at 
least sometimes, be self-directed. This is sometimes linked with the argument 
concerning expression as a form of identification, where identifying with some position 
or cause combines elements of self-identification and identifying oneself to others. In 
the context of voting, the lack of an obvious audience in a secret ballot might be thought 
to undermine the incentive to vote expressively, but here we might point to slightly 
more complicated expressive argument. Suppose that I have an expressive desire to 
support a particular political position, or particular political cause. Even if we admit that 
merely voting for that position or cause cannot in itself count as ‘expressing’ myself 
because of a lack of relevant audience, I can surely hold that I may wish to express my 
political views in all sorts of public arenas, and the only way in which I can make these 
expressions while maintaining a degree of internal consistency and integrity is to vote 
expressively. Here then the vote is not itself expressive, but it is a precondition for 
expression.17  
 
Another version of the idea that you may be your own audience in matters of expression 
arises in the discussion of cases such as philanthropy.  For example, Andreoni  argues 
that individuals derive private benefits from a ‘warm glow’ associated with giving, and 
it is for this reason that philanthropy occurs on a much greater scale than standard 
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economic theory would lead us to expect. To the extent that expressive voting is 
analogous to the ‘warm glow’ in charitable giving, it is clear that the relevant audience 
is oneself. 
 
While it seems reasonable to allow the possibility of being your own audience, is it 
plausible to allow the possibility of there being no audience at all? Here we think that 
the answer is no; although we accept that this is largely a matter of stipulation. It is 
difficult to see how the idea of a motivating expression can generate the required 
motivational force if it is has no possible audience. But note that we are here adding the 
rider of a ‘possible’ audience; it may well be the case that a motivating expression 
operates on the basis of an intended (or perhaps even a hoped for) audience that never in 
fact materialises. So that it is the intended, possible audience that matters in building an 
explanation of the underlying behaviour, and the fact that there was no actual audience 
may be neither here nor there.  
 
Our third concern relates to the issue of whether expressed views hold any particular 
relationship to truly-held views. There is much debate to be had in this area, but we 
offer some simple initial thoughts. First, it seems inappropriate to begin from a position 
that identifies either purely instrumental or purely expressive 
preferences/views/opinions with true preferences/views/opinions as a matter of 
definition. The more reasonable and less restrictive starting point seems to be one that 
recognises that any individual at any time is likely to hold a range of preferences, views 
and opinions - both instrumental and expressive - where there is no necessary 
requirement of absolute coherence. From this starting point, it might seem that a context 
that brings both instrumental and expressive considerations to bear on decision making, 
each with their appropriate weight, is one which would allow the individual to reach an 
all-things-considered decision that might be as close as we are likely to get to reflecting 
some idea of ‘true’ or ‘fully considered’ preferences/views/opinions.18 And in 
circumstances that privilege either instrumental or expressive concerns at the expense of 
the other, we are likely to reveal only a limited sub-set of the full range of 
preferences/views/opinions. In this sense, neither instrumental nor expressive 
preferences may be taken as ‘true’, while each reflects an element of some underlying 
truth.  Similarly both instrumental and expressive actions may be deceptive in the sense 
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of being intended to deceive. We will return to discuss issues of deception and self-
deception in section 3.3 below.  
 
So, at this stage, we offer the following three defining aspects of expressive behaviour 
and the distinction between expressive and instrumental behaviour.  
   
(1) Behaviour is expressive to the extent that it reflects, wholly or partly, underlying 
concerns that derive directly from the meaning or symbolic significance of actions or 
choices themselves, rather than their indirect consequences or consumption benefits. 
Expressive concerns sit alongside instrumental concerns within a structure of overall 
rational choice.19 Institutional contexts will influence the balance between instrumental 
and expressive considerations in particular cases. Pure cases arise when one class of 
consideration is entirely suppressed. More generally, there may be a trade-off between 
instrumental and expressive considerations.     
 
 (2) Expressive behaviour is to be understood relative to an audience, either directly or 
indirectly, intended or anticipated, and allowing for the fact that an individual may, in at 
least some circumstances, be their own audience. This is to indicate that the 
specification of the intended audience, as well as the specification of the actor, may be 
required to fully understand expressive behaviour. I may have good reasons to express 
myself very differently to different audiences, even though my underlying concerns 
(both instrumental and expressive) are constant.  
 
(3) Both expressive and instrumental preferences and beliefs may be ’true’ in the sense 
of being held on the basis of full information and full consideration, even when they are 
in conflict. Neither instrumental nor expressive concerns should be viewed as 
definitionally more foundational than the other. The normative status of expressive (or 
indeed, instrumental) behaviour is a matter for further analysis, and will need to account 
for the possibility of distorted or manipulated behaviour.  
 
It should be clear that these three statements do not serve to fully characterise 
expressive motivations or expressive behaviour – they serve only to provide a structure 
within which such expressive behaviour can be understood and analysed. In order to 
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complete the definitional exercise we must confront the fundamental questions of the 
content of expressive motivations.  
 
3. Theories of Expressive Choice 
We now survey the various substantive theories of expressive choice that have emerged, 
and the empirical work associated with them.  As already noted, most of the work on 
expressive choice has been developed in the context of the discussion of voting, but in 
what follows reference will be made to theories and applications that bear no direct 
relationship to mass elections.  
 
We begin with a version of the expressive account which provides a reason for voting, 
but carries no implications for how to vote. This is the idea of ‘expressive choice as 
doing one’s duty’ developed by Riker and Ordeshook.20  This approach proposes that 
voters express their respect for duty through voting. However, since there is clearly no 
duty to vote for any particular candidate or option, duty itself can have no impact on 
how to vote. On this account, the expressive value of ‘doing one’s duty’ gets around the 
paradox of voting without challenging the results of the standard instrumental model in 
relation to electoral outcomes.  Of course, when applied outside the field of voting, the 
idea of duty as an expressive motivator of actions may carry a wide range of different 
implications depending on what is considered to fall within the remit of ‘duty’. We will 
return to the link between expressive choice and moral choice below. 
 
The civic duty based version of expressive voting theory seems to draw some support 
from the evidence for strategic voting that is normally interpreted in instrumental 
terms.21 This tells us that where a voter ranks candidates A, B, C in order of all-things-
considered desirability, but where A is known to have no chance of winning the 
election, a strategic voter will vote for B rather than A in an attempt to prevent C from 
winning. This certainly seems to be an instrumental explanation for strategic voting 
since the voter would seem to be committed to a logic that relies on the possibility that 
their vote is decisive so that failure to vote for B might allow their least preferred 
candidate C to win. Theories of expressive choice that also address the how (and not 
just why) question in relation to voting might therefore appear to have some difficulty 
explaining strategic voting. However, Brennan rebuts the claim that evidence of 
strategic voting provides evidence against expressive voting and advances two 
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arguments that might reconcile strategic voting and expressive voting.22  First, that 
voting is a serious undertaking and that the voter might consider it frivolous and 
irresponsible to vote for A if A is widely thought to have no chance of winning. Second, 
expressive choice can be about booing as well as cheering. There may be greater 
expressive value in booing for C (by voting for B) than in cheering for A.   
 
Brennan’s defence of an expressive understanding of strategic voting seems to accept 
the idea that the expressive ranking of A, B and C is the same as the all-things-
considered ranking. But clearly this need not be the case. An alternative explanation of 
apparently strategic voting might rely on differences in these rankings. So that while a 
particular pattern of voting might appear to be ‘strategic’ when considered in terms of 
the all-things-considered ranking, it is revealed to be straightforwardly rational when 
considered in terms of the expressive ranking alone (which would still allow for 
Brennan’s possibility of booing rather than cheering). This raises the questions of what 
factors are likely to determine an expressive ranking in the first instance, and under 
what circumstances instrumental and expressive rankings are likely to diverge?  In order 
to categorize expressive accounts in terms of the broad nature of their claims regarding 
the content of expression, we begin by considering variations on the theme of 
expressing identity, before considering the possibility that morality may provide the 
relevant content for expressive behaviour. Finally we consider the idea that the content 
of expression may derive from social pressures, ignorance or illusion. With these three 
broad accounts in place, we will then turn to questions of the efficiency or inefficiency 
of expressive behaviour and its institutional implications. 
 
3.1 Expressive Choice as Identity Based 
The general idea of considerations of identity playing an important role in the economic 
analysis of decision making has developed in recent years.23 The link with expressive 
behaviour is that some actions directly express the actor’s identity (or the identity they 
wish to project) and this provides a route to explaining those actions. As already noted, 
Hillman defines all expressive behaviour as being associated with acts motivated to 
confirm identity and builds a model that explores the trade-offs between expressive and 
instrumental motivations in a variety of settings.24  Here we take the rather different 
route of considering several different aspects of what it may mean to express identity.  
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3.1.1 Social Identification  
Schuessler proposed the idea that what motivates voters is how many others vote for a 
particular option or candidate, and who the other voters are.25 In this way, identity is 
confirmed through association with specific groups of others.  In simple terms, voting 
for X identifies you with the set of people who vote for X. Numbers may matter because 
you would not wish to identify with too small a group, but also because too large a 
group may dilute the value of the expressive attachment.  But the particular identity of 
the voters that you seek to identify with, rather than just their number, may be more 
relevant. If all voters are seeking purely to associate themselves with groups of other 
voters, using the candidates or electoral options only as points around which to 
congregate as a mutually identifying club, there may be many possible equilibria; with 
the prospect of instability, tipping points and bandwagon effects. However, if there are 
at least some voters who might be considered as partisans, in the sense that their 
motivations for voting points to voting for a specific option or candidate, these partisans 
may provide focal points around which others cluster, so reducing the tendency to 
instability. 
 
Candidates and political parties, faced with such voters have a clear incentive to appeal 
to groups that would also provide them with a winning level of support. Generally, 
parties will want to present themselves as a club with an attractive combination of 
membership type and membership numbers.  A prediction deriving from Schuessler’s 
approach is that expressive behaviour can help to explain the impact of negative 
campaigning and the polarisation of voters. Negative campaigns focus on identifying 
the character of other parties, and attacking that character so as to make it seem an 
unattractive club to join. Seen from the perspective of any single party, negative 
campaigning will be a useful weapon in reducing the attractiveness of rival clubs. 
However, negative campaigning by all parties will make all of the available ‘clubs’ less 
attractive, implying lower turnout overall. And, of course, it will be the least committed 
members of the electorate who will be dissuaded from voting by negative campaigning 
so that the remaining voters are more likely to be partisans, so that parties are more 
likely to be polarised.   
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Rotemberg provides an alternative account in which voters identify with individuals that 
they agree with.26  This model builds on two psychological tendencies.  First, people 
tend to be altruistic toward individuals that agree with them; and second, individuals 
gain in self-esteem from discovering agreement. One challenge to the idea that voting is 
expressive is the correlation between voter turnout and the closeness of the election. 
This correlation might suggest that voters are behaving instrumentally and the higher 
turnout reflects an increase in the (admittedly small) probability of being decisive. 
Interestingly, Rotemberg argues that this correlation can be explained by reference to 
the psychological tendencies that motivate his model, as voters receive greater 
psychological benefits in close rather than one-sided elections. In this way, Rotemberg 
argues, the correlation between the closeness of the election and turnout can be provided 
with a basis in the logic of expressive voting.   
 
Hamlin and Jennings extend the idea of the motivating force of social identification 
from the domain of voting to the more general setting of the formation of political 
groups.27 Here the target is not just the emergence of groups, but the explanation of 
conflict between such groups, and the emergence of group leaders who may mediate 
that conflict.   Brennan and Pettit  provide a further variant on the theme by exploring 
the idea of esteem (and self-esteem) as a motivator of behaviour.28 On their account, it 
is the quest for the good opinion of others (or oneself) that provides a basic driving 
force behind behaviour that might be considered expressive.   
 
 
3.1.2 Identification with Parties or Candidates 
Brennan and Hamlin put forward the idea that expressive choice may be related more to 
identifying directly with parties, candidates or political positions rather than with groups 
of other voters.29 They suggest that elections may be dominated by issues that capture 
expressive interest, and that these issues may exist in a domain that differs from that 
which accounts for instrumental concerns. But even if the domain of expressive 
concerns is similar to the domain of instrumental concerns, the distribution of 
expressive preferences may differ markedly from the distribution of instrumental 
preferences. 
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In the Brennan and Hamlin model, voters vote for positions/candidates that are 
sufficiently close to their own ideal point in the expressive domain. If there are no 
candidates within a certain distance of their ideal point, they do not vote. As in the 
standard spatial model, candidates can adjust their platforms strategically to attract 
voters. This leads to a result that is roughly equivalent to the standard median voter 
theorem in the setting of instrumental voting, although it emphasizes the significance of 
the modal voter rather than the median voter.   
 
However, the Brennan and Hamlin argument leads to an empirical prediction that 
distinguishes their expressive model from the parallel instrumental model. Although 
parties/candidates face similar incentives in the two models, and will tend to converge 
on ‘moderate’ positions, the decision of whether to vote is very different in the two 
models. Brennan and Hamlin predict that, in the expressive case, moderates will vote 
with extremists abstaining, while the standard instrumental model suggests the opposite. 
In an instrumental model moderates are non-voters because they are broadly indifferent 
across the alternative candidates, while in an expressive model extremists are non-voters 
because they are alienated.30   
 
Greene and Nelson set out to test this prediction and find that extremists are as likely to 
vote as moderates and thus argue that Brennan and Hamlin’s prediction does not hold.31  
But Greene and Nelson effectively rule out instrumental voting by assumption, so that 
their model is inconsistent with Brennan and Hamlin’s at the level of design. A more 
appropriate test of the Brennan and Hamlin prediction would be to check the nature of 
motivation for extremists and moderates. If the former are instrumentally motivated and 
the latter expressively motivated, then the Brennan and Hamlin prediction is supported. 
Drinkwater and Jennings conduct such an analysis and find support for the Brennan and 
Hamlin prediction32. Calcagno and Westley also find evidence in support of Brennan 
and Hamlin’s thesis by considering the effect of primaries on turnout in general 
elections.33 Closed primaries lead to greater divergence between general election 
candidates than open primaries. An instrumental account of voting predicts that turnout 
should be higher in states with closed primaries, while the expressive account of voting 
would predict that the greater identity with the convergent candidates should lead to 
higher turnout in states with open primaries. Calcagno and Westley find that turnout in a 
general election is greater the more open the primaries.34 
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The normative implications of the identity-based models surveyed so far are unclear. 
They predict limited convergence in an, as yet, unspecified expressive dimension. One 
strong implication from the Brennan and Hamlin model, however, is that global 
instability (due to cycling) is implausible. Quite simply, political positions that are too 
far from voter’s expressive preferences will never be selected. 
 
3.2 Expressive Choice as Moral Choice 
3.2.1 Voting for moral or desirable characteristics 
In a further paper35, Brennan and Hamlin reconsider the argument for representative 
democracy over direct democracy in expressive terms. In instrumental theory, the 
argument for representative democracy is essentially of a second-best nature: direct 
democracy would be superior to representative democracy but for the costs involved 
and other issues of feasibility. The expressive reconsideration is two-pronged. First, 
direct democracy may be rendered problematic by inefficient expressive choice on 
policy issues, (to be discussed below). But second, and more positively, in the case of 
representative democracy, voters may pick out moral or other desirable qualities in their 
representatives that particularly suit them for political office, so that representatives are 
on average more moral or more talented or more competent than would be the case if 
they were drawn from the population in some way that was statistically representative. 
The institutional implications are striking.36 In contrast to the heavy emphasis on 
imposing constraints on government that normally characterises the public choice 
literature,37 there is less need to be concerned about the principal/agent problem 
between politicians and the citizenry.  The focus of attention shifts, at least to some 
extent, from the imposition of constitutional constraints on politicians assumed to be 
self-interested, and toward the design of institutions that select politicians with 
appropriate characteristics.  
 
The idea of the expressive selection of moral, competent or otherwise desirable 
politicians or policies also links with the idea of understanding individual political 
motivations more in terms of dispositions and commitments rather than pure 
preferences.38 The combination of politicians who can credibly commit to particular 
dispositions, and voters who select politicians at least partly on the basis of their 
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disposition, reinforces the idea that constitutional arrangements that empower 
politicians rather than constrain them may be warranted.   
 
But the link from this aspect of the expressive literature to the wider debate on 
constitutional design has another element. To the extent that constitutions themselves 
are approved by popular voting, we might expect the expressive argument to apply to 
the choice of constitutional provisions themselves, as well as the operation of everyday 
politics within the chosen constitutional structures.39 This link reminds us that 
constitutions are themselves the outcomes of political processes and must be seen as 
endogenous.  
 
3.2.2 Voting for merit goods 
Brennan and Lomasky argue that a distinction can be made between ‘expressive choice’ 
(political choice), ‘instrumental choice’ (market choice) and fully reflective or all-
things-considered choice.40 The normative appeal of the idea of individual autonomy 
(and consumer sovereignty) rests on the basis of fully reflective choice, but choices 
reflect institutional settings, so that the institutional framing of decisions is significant in 
explaining the decision. In choosing between institutional settings,  politics versus the 
market, for example, we should be aware that both politics and the market are ‘frames’ 
and that, in at least some cases, expressive choice in a political frame may yield a closer 
approximation to fully reflective choice than instrumental choice in a market frame.  
 
How then do we identify such cases? One example relates to merit goods.41 Brennan 
and Lomasky argue that the more expressive political environment may be more 
appropriate than the market in such cases, since the market can be expected to 
consistently under-supply merit goods. Furthermore, to the extent that a political 
mechanism is used, the act of contemplation prior to a vote may bring more reflective 
preferences to the fore, such that they may have a subsequent effect on how individuals 
behave in market choices. This implies that reflection contributes to an expressive 
choice which may in turn influence instrumental choice, pointing to a possible route by 
which the interaction between expressive and instrumental choices may be mutually 
informative. 
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3.2.3 Voting for redistribution: generosity and altruism 
Redistributive taxation may result from voting even where each individual is narrowly 
self-interested and purely instrumental.42 But there is a major strand of the literature on 
redistribution that starts from the presumption of some degree of altruism or generosity 
understood as a concern for the welfare, or income level, of others.43 Once a degree is 
altruism is in place, the expressive possibility is clear, and the expressive aspect of 
political choice may be important. The basic story, then, is that if we compare the 
situation in which redistribution is a matter of private philanthropy with the otherwise 
similar situation in which a public redistributive scheme may be enacted via a popular 
vote, we would expect significantly more redistribution in the latter case. And this for 
three reasons: first and most obviously, some voters will expect to benefit directly from 
redistribution and will have instrumental reason to vote for it (although to the extent that 
the election is large, this may not be sufficient to cause them to vote). Second, some of 
those who expect to contribute to the redistributive scheme but who are altruistic to a 
sufficient extent will have  reason to vote to achieve their all-things-considered desired 
outcome (although, again, this may not be sufficient to cause them to vote). But third, 
all of those who are altruistic to at least some degree will recognise the opportunity to 
express their altruism, and here the fact that the election is large will ensure that there is 
little cost to such expression and so encourage them to vote.  
 
The argument could be taken further, to the point where no actual altruistic motivation 
is required for individuals to vote for redistribution since such a vote offers uncharitable 
individuals the (cheap) opportunity to appear charitable.44  This further step of the 
argument takes us back to the idea of voting to confirm identity, and the possibility of 
projecting an identity that is flattering but deceptive. Hillman extends this argument 
further, beyond the idea of the uncharitable voting for redistribution to the idea of 
private charitable giving itself, particularly in the context of international aid.45 He 
argues that private philanthropy (rather than voting for public philanthropy) may reflect 
an expressive attempt to self-identify as a generous person, which does not require 
genuine generosity or altruism as a motivation.  
 
There have been numerous empirical studies of the expressive case for voting for 
redistribution. Carter and Guerete find only weak evidence, but Fischer  builds on that 
study to find considerably stronger evidence in support of the expressive account. Later 
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papers confirm this support.46   Interestingly, Tyran does not find direct support for the 
expressive view of redistribution, but does find support for the view that voters tend to 
approve proposals if they expect others to support them.47 
 
3.3 Social Pressure, Information and Illusion 
We have argued that the idea of true preferences need play no role in the definition of 
expressive behaviour. Consider the issue of redistribution, where we might observe an 
individual choosing ‘selfishly’ in their private or market-based activities, but choosing 
more ‘benevolently’ in the political arena. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
identify whether the ‘true’ preferences of the individual are ‘selfish’ or ‘benevolent’ (or 
some mix of the two) since we argue that each institutional ‘frame’ elicits a particular 
behaviour from some underlying set of preferences (both instrumental and expressive), 
rather than directly ‘revealing’ true preferences. Given that market choice is decisive 
and responsible, it might be argued that it reflects an all-things-considered perspective 
and thus does reveal ‘true’ preferences. Indeed, this would seem to be the position often 
adopted in the literature. However, if every institutional setting is a potentially 
distorting frame, there may be no neutral setting which allows ‘true’ underlying 
preferences to be directly revealed. This point is highlighted further if we re-consider 
the discussion regarding merit goods where we argued that the political arena may be 
the more likely arena to elicit ‘true’ preferences in at least some cases. 
 
A background assumption here is that behaviour is equally informed, free, and 
autonomous whether it is in a market setting or in a political setting, and it is partly 
because of this symmetry assumption that we conclude that neither setting is superior in 
providing a ‘fully revealing’ context for choice. If it could be argued that one setting 
was systematically inferior to the other in terms of information, or autonomy, or in 
some other relevant way, this would certainly be relevant to the overall consideration of 
the relationship between preferences revealed under any particular institutional 
framework and ‘true’ preferences.  We will now consider examples where constraints 
are imposed upon political action such that political behaviour which may seem to be 
expressive may also be interpreted as artificially or exogenously constrained. In these 
examples, the statement that expressive behaviour may not reflect’ true’ expressive 
preferences is explicitly built into the discussion48.  
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Consider again the distinction between examples like cheering at a sports match or 
participating in a dinner party conversation on the one hand, and voting on the other. As 
already noted, one key difference lies in the identification of an audience. Where a 
specific audience is in place, it may be that,  as Kuran argues, individuals are 
pressurised to conform to that audience.49 On the one hand the anonymity of voting may 
reduce its expressive significance by limiting the direct audience; on the other hand, 
anonymity seems to protect the voter from social pressure, thus increasing the 
likelihood that the expressive content of a vote is in some relevant sense ‘authentic’. 
 
Where expressions are public, there may be hidden costs in the form of social pressures 
that distort the expression made.  And while the secret ballot may provide some 
insurance against such pressures, voting is not the only politically relevant form of 
expressive behaviour. Many actions such as attending demonstrations or political 
meetings, engaging in political debate, indeed almost all aspects of ‘political 
participation’ are likely to engage expressive behaviour.50 Since these forms of 
behaviour are often essentially public, the question arises of whether there is a way of 
separating authentic from socially constrained expressions?   
 
In the examples explored by Kuran (such as the support of repressive regimes in pre-
1989 East European countries), political equilibrium is highly unstable as the views 
expressed are not truly held and we should expect bandwagon effects (as happened in 
post-1989 East European countries). In contrast, one might expect views that are truly 
held to be more stable. So, the stability of political equilibria, where equilibrium clearly 
features mass support and thus expressive behaviour, might offer a potential test of how 
authentic the underlying political expression is.  
 
If we observe individuals engaged in collective action where we are confident that the 
views expressed are not the result of distorting social pressure, can we be sure that the 
opinions displayed are expressive? There are at least two further challenges. These are 
the roles played by information and illusion.  
 
In addition to the paradox of voting, Downs famously drew attention to the idea of 
rational ignorance.51 Given the low probability of being decisive there is a low incentive 
to become informed about issues. Caplan extends this idea by developing the idea of 
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‘rational irrationality’ to suggest that while voters may happily incur the low costs of 
voting, they may also express ill-informed and biased opinions which, when aggregated, 
can lead to inefficient policies.52 Of course, it is the claim of bias, rather than the simple 
claim of relatively ill-informed opinion that is important to this argument.  A crucial 
finding in Caplan’s supporting empirical work is that citizens untrained in economics 
have systematically biased beliefs relative to those trained in economics53. He argues 
that the untrained hold these biases because people desire certain beliefs and will hold 
these beliefs even when they run contrary to evidence or expert opinion.  
 
Beliefs are viewed as normal goods, when their price is low demand for them will be 
high. The price will be low in situations where the belief has no direct day-to-day 
implications for the individual concerned.  There will be many areas in which 
individuals face low-cost decisions between alternative beliefs and may ‘choose’ their 
beliefs to fit with their other preferences and prejudices. But if individuals vote by 
expressing such beliefs, they may have important social and political implications in the 
aggregate.  
 
Rational irrationality differs from the simple case of rational ignorance because of the 
role of the idea of choosing beliefs and the possibility that this leads to bias rather than 
just ignorance. Rational irrationality is clearly a member of the same family of ideas as 
expressiveness as the argument is driven by the underlying idea of the inconsequential 
nature of certain choices, but Caplan is careful to distinguish the two: ‘In expressive 
voting theory, voters know that feel-good policies are ineffective. Expressive voters do 
not embrace dubious or absurd beliefs about the world……In contrast, rationally 
irrational voters believe that feel-good policies work.’54 
 
So, a further condition would need to be fulfilled in order to judge a vote to be 
expressive of true preferences rather than rationally irrational, we would need to check 
how well-informed the voter is. One suspects that this issue may be similar to social 
pressure. If voting is both expressive and ‘rationally irrational’ making information 
available might be expected to result in a rapid and significant shift in the political 
equilibrium. If, on the other hand, voting is an expression of truly-held expressive 
preferences, the political equilibrium will be much more stable.55 
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A further challenge to a conclusion that voting is expressive of truly-held preferences 
stems from Akerlof’s analysis of illusion.56  Our every-day interactions may influence 
the preferences that we bring to politics. For example, where a market failure exists due 
to free-riding, those who engage in free-riding may justify it to themselves through the 
process of cognitive dissonance. So that, when an attempt is made to correct the market 
failure through the political process, voters may vote to maintain the inefficiency since 
they have already justified their actions to themselves. This is a particularly thorny 
problem. Voters would appear to be expressing their true beliefs, but these beliefs are 
the result of a prior act of self-deception. Once again we would simply note that any 
attempt to locate ‘true’ preferences is likely to run into a wide range of difficulties of 
this type, involving the endogeneity of preferences through both voluntary and 
involuntary processes. While we certainly accept the difficulty in saying anything very 
clear about true preferences, we do not think that this difficulty arises, or is seriously 
exacerbated, as a result of distinguishing between expressive and instrumental 
behaviour.   
 
3.4 Inefficient Expressive Choice? 
If some arguments paint a picture of expressive behaviour that seems normatively 
benign and even desirable, there is also an alternative picture available that portrays 
expressive choice in terms of prejudice, fear and intemperate reaction. Two ideas 
emerge from this more negative conception of expressiveness.  
 
A dark side of expressiveness seen as the confirmation of identity relates to the fact that 
identity is often confirmed by reference to a rival or ‘other’ group, perhaps in forms that 
result in inter-group conflict, so that the expressive nature of political choice may help 
to explain conflict which might be avoided by instrumental behaviour.57  Kaempfer and 
Lowenburg explore the role of nationalist attachment in cases of international 
sanctions.58 The traditional argument for economic sanctions has been an instrumental 
one: sanctions may bring favourable policy change in the target country by imposing, or 
threatening, economic harm. But the instrumental case for economic sanctions often 
appears weak. Kaempfer and Lowenburg argue that while some pressure groups in the 
sanctioning country gain instrumentally from sanctions, most citizens gain purely 
expressive benefits by taking a stand against the targeted country even though the 
collective stand may lead to high costs for these citizens. The imposition of sanctions 
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may paradoxically strengthen the objectionable government in the targeted country as 
the citizens there expressively ‘rally around the flag’.59 Glazer models the role of anger 
in party political competition and uses this to explain possible divergence in the position 
of the competing parties.60 Tyran and Engelmann, in an experimental study, investigate 
consumer boycotts and find that consumers often approve of boycotts for essentially 
expressive reasons in situations where there are no effective  instrumental reasons.61  
 
Expressive choice may also help to explain inefficient redistribution without recourse to 
complex explanations based on information asymmetry or transfers to maintain 
numbers within an interest group. Consider Acemoglu and Robinson’s discussion of 
inefficient redistribution.62 They focus on the inability to form binding commitments as 
the trigger which leads interest groups to seek redistribution inefficiently through 
specific policy interventions rather than efficiently through cash transfers. While this 
theory may explain a significant fraction of the support for inefficient transfers (namely 
the support by members of the recipient groups), it is also the case that such policies are 
often supported by wider groups of voters who are not direct beneficiaries of the policy, 
and who may actually be disadvantaged by such policies. Where an inefficient 
redistribution policy receives a high level of support it would seem likely that a large 
proportion of those supporters are not material beneficiaries of the policy.63 An 
expressive account offers an explanation for such support and also suggests why such 
voters may respond particularly positively to inefficient redistribution policies rather 
than cash transfers, since the relative transparency of cash transfers will make the cost 
of the policy more salient.  A key point here is that political entrepreneurs, who make 
instrumental choices (because they are in decisive or directly consequential positions), 
may manipulate collectives to support positions that actually leave them worse-off, but 
benefit the interest group that the political entrepreneur represents.64  
 
Clearly expressive voting and political behaviour can produce inefficient and even 
disastrous outcomes. There can be no sustainable claim that expressive behaviour is 
always a force for good in the world65.  Equally, there can be no sustainable claim that 
expressive behaviour is always a force for bad in the world   This is an appropriate point 
to underline the idea that political outcomes are always the result of the interaction 
between expressive and instrumental behaviour.  Even if many ordinary citizens can be 
expected to act expressively in many political situations, there will typically be some 
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individuals who will face strong incentives to act instrumentally: not least professional 
politicians. To the extent that professional politicians are in the business of being 
elected, they will face incentives to appeal to voters in any way that is available to them, 
and this will include presenting themselves and their policy positions in expressively 
salient ways, and engaging in expressive rhetoric.  This will involve a whole series of 
trade-offs. Some voters may be expressively drawn to candidates who exhibit certain 
characteristics that they wish to identify with, even where these characteristics may not 
relate directly to political positions or policies. Others may be expressively drawn to 
support moral positions. Still others may be drawn to express anger or display hostility 
to external groups. And so on.  We might expect politicians of various types to emerge 
to reflect this range. The recognition of the relevance of  expressive motivations does 
not make the analysis of politics simpler,  rather it shifts  the debate away from a focus 
on the domain of interests (in all their diversity) and towards a focus on the domain of 
expressed opinions (in all their diversity). 
 
 
3.5 Institutional Implications 
Expressive choice provides a rather different perspective on the issue of institutional 
design.  Once we recognise that at least some political behaviour may be expressive in 
nature, and that expressive concerns are of relevance, we must reconsider the more 
standard arguments for the design of political institutions.  
 
The nature of this reconsideration is to institutionalise the more ‘positive’ aspects of 
expressive behaviour, while neutralizing the more ‘negative’ aspects. But this can only 
be translated into real institutional design/reform to the extent that we can identify 
structures and institutions within a society that are more likely to prompt some 
particular kinds of expressions as opposed to others. The interesting question then is the 
balance between welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing aspects of expressive choice 
and whether there is anything that can be done by way of institutional design to select 
for the former and against the latter. 
 
The emphasis on institutional design has formed the cornerstone of the normative 
approach taken by public choice and constitutional political economy. Since The 
Calculus of Consent the argument has been made forcefully that political outcomes are 
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best seen as functions of the particular political institutions and rules-of-the-game in 
place, and that the construction of an artificial social welfare function will not resolve 
disputes.66  On this view, hope lies in finding more basic agreement on institutions and  
the rules of the game, as citizens might choose them behind a ‘veil of uncertainty’. This 
insight is not fundamentally altered by an awareness that much political behaviour is 
likely to be expressive in nature. All that would seem to be required is that the role of 
expressive choice is given full consideration when institutions are designed.67 
 
While recognizing the importance of expressive concerns in the normative analysis of 
institutional design, Brennan and Hamlin highlight the problem that follows from 
acknowledging the presence of expressive choice in the positive analysis of the process 
of institutional design.68 If institutional or constitutional design is itself subject to a 
process that encourages expressive behaviour in circumstances where we have reason to 
believe that expressive views may depart from all-things-considered views, we have 
little reason to have confidence that appropriate institutions will emerge. Large numbers 
of citizens being asked to support a constitutional proposal in a referendum may reject it 
expressively even though they may have accepted it instrumentally, or on the basis of an 
all-things-considered evaluation. Brennan and Hamlin argue that subjecting 
constitutional proposals to a popular vote may undermine well-designed rules. Perhaps, 
these proposals should be decided by small (but representative) groups, who might be 
more likely to take an all-things-considered view. Crampton and Farrant make explicit 
the potential problem that such a small group might design institutions that enrich 
themselves if they are not fully representative in a relevant sense.69 Therefore, a trade-
off may exist between the problem of expressiveness on one hand and allowing too 
much room for the narrow self-interest of unrepresentative groups on the other. More 
recently, Brennan and Hamlin point to the significance of written versus unwritten 
constitutions, in that written constitutions may provide more clearly specified rules, but 
are more likely to be infected with rhetorical appeal and heavy symbolism that may 
limit the operational efficacy of the constitution.70 Written constitutions are to be seen 
as ‘expressive documents’ that are used to express identity or ideology as well as to 
specify the rules of the political game, and in this sense there may be some support for 
an emergent or unwritten constitution.  
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More optimistically, Jennings argues that if a constitution must be passed by 
referendum then additional institutional apparatus may be required within that 
constitution that may not have been required from a purely instrumental perspective.71 
The argument is illustrated by reference to the 1998 Belfast Agreement where it could 
be argued that aspects of that agreement were included primarily to stave off expressive 
rejection at the stage of the popular referendum.     
 
We have focussed on the idea that expressive concerns can be relevant at the 
constitutional level of institutional design as well as at the political level of policy 
choice within given institutional arrangements. But we began this section with the 
contrast between the principal-agent conception of the design of political institutions 
that is recommended by the standard instrumental account of political behaviour, and 
the broader conception that accompanies the expressive perspective. This should not be 
taken to indicate that the principal-agent idea becomes irrelevant in a more expressive 
world. Rather, it is no longer the only game in town.72  At least two further ideas 
become relevant. The first is the general idea of selection and the role of political 
leaders.73 Politicians, and leaders in all arenas, may be selected for particular 
characteristics, rather than simply as the embodiment of a package of policy measures. 
And to the extent that the characteristics selected for have normative dimensions (not 
least in terms of the motivations of candidates, or characteristics such as honesty) we 
might expect the selection mechanism to carry direct normative implications. On this 
reading, politics clearly runs the risk of institutionalizing an adverse-selection problem, 
but also has the potential to institutionalize a more positive selection game.  
 
The second general idea rendered salient by the discussion of expressive behaviour 
might be referred to as feedback or reinforcement effects.  Once we recognise that 
variations in the institutional environment can be important in influencing both how we 
express our political preferences and what political preferences we express, it is a short 
step to building this idea into our thinking on institutional design, so that we may favour 
those institutional structures that elicit the most ‘positive’ or relevant aspects of our 
motivation. In some cases, this may imply institutions that avoid individually 
inconsequential behaviour and encourage what might be loosely referred to as 
‘responsible’ choice. Such institutions may carry the flavour of the market.  But in other 
cases, it will be necessary and appropriate to design our institutions in such a way as to 
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elicit political expressions, and here it may be important to structure our political 
institutions so as to avoid some aspects of expressive behaviour while encouraging 
others.  
 
4. Concluding Comments 
In exploring the idea of expressive behaviour we have both attempted to understand the 
essential structure of the expressive argument and to illustrate the great variety of 
substantive ideas that can be articulated within the expressive framework. We will not 
attempt to summarise or review the wide range of points made, but will restrict 
ourselves to just two final thoughts that reflect the two major aims identified in the 
introduction.   
 
In working toward a definition of expressive behaviour we have stressed the idea that 
expressive and instrumental aspects of motivation sit alongside each other as parts of 
all-things-considered motivation.  Expressive preferences, like instrumental preferences 
reflect a valid part of our motivations, but only a part. Different institutional settings 
may elicit responses that reflect different parts of our motivational structure, and we 
should recognise this fact both when analyzing and evaluating the outcomes achieved 
under different institutional settings and when designing and reforming the  institutions 
that frame our behaviour.  Of course, some specific expressive concerns may be 
manipulated, or the result of deception (including self-deception) or social pressures. 
But the same is true of some instrumental concerns. There is nothing in the mere fact 
that a concern is expressive (or instrumental) that either grants that concern special 
normative salience, or implies lesser behavioural significance.  Expressive motivations 
apply everywhere, not just in voting or in collective action problems where instrumental 
issues are muted by the inconsequential nature of individual behaviour. Of course, the 
relative weight given to expressive considerations will vary systematically with the 
institutional settings which frame behaviour, but some expressive concerns may be 
strong enough to determine behaviour in the most consequential settings.  
 
The broad range of substantive ideas that may be relevant within the category of the 
expressive may, at first sight, seem to restrict the value of the expressive insight since 
there can be no easy argument that expressive behaviour is always of a particular type, 
or always carries a particular normative implication.  But closer consideration 
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recognizes that the variety of ideas within the expressive domain is no more problematic 
than the variety of preferences in the instrumental domain. What is important is that the 
heterogeneity of expressive consideration, as well as the heterogeneity of more 
instrumental interests, is reflected in our political and institutional analysis at an 
appropriate level of granularity. Of course this implies that politics is complex, and the 
appropriate design of political institutions is subject to a large variety of considerations 
and trade-offs, but it also allows us to recognise the value of a range of institutional and 
political mechanisms that might appear rather mysterious under a purely instrumental 
understanding of politics. In this way, the expressive literature both adds to the diversity 
of political problems recognised within this branch of political economy, but also adds 
to the diversity of potential solutions to those problems. 
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